

VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKO #1556 1610031
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 090031Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4863

UNCLAS TOKYO 001556

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: [KNNP](#) [TRGY](#) [PREL](#) [PARM](#) [IR](#) [MNUC](#) [AORC](#) [IAEA](#) [UNSC](#) [JA](#)
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: JAPAN'S RESPONSE TO CRITICAL
EQUIPMENT NEEDS FOR IRAN'S NEW IR-2 CENTRIFUGE DESIGN

REF: STATE 52030

1. (U) Please see action requests in paragraphs 3 and 4.

2. (SBU) ESToff delivered non-paper and photos in ref to METI Security Export Control Policy Division Deputy Director Atsushi Tanizawa and Deputy Director Yukio Yoshihiro May 29. Tanizawa said Japan is complying with UN Security Council Resolutions 1737 and 1803 regarding strict export control of dual-use items to Iran. ESToff urged the officials to engage in further outreach with Japanese companies and ensure they are aware of critical commodities that front companies could use to expand Iran's uranium enrichment efforts. The Japanese firm Toray, for example, is a major carbon fiber producer, which is a critical commodity Iran might seek for its IR-2 centrifuge.

3. (SBU) The METI officials asked that ESToff forward a letter in English (contained in paragraph 4) to Washington agencies regarding GOJ efforts at enforcing export control regulations. In addition, Tanizawa requested further clarification of which specific countries Japanese companies should be wary. In the past, METI has been very careful when dealing with companies located in Dubai and the UAE because it had found multiple front companies posing as legitimate businesses, he said. The GOJ would appreciate any additional information to convey to companies before conducting its outreach.

4. (SBU) BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER.

Thank you for your information regarding Iranian centrifuge, IR-2.

In accordance with UNSCR 1737 and 1803, we have been enforcing strict export control toward Iran. It is our practice not to grant any export licenses for NSG list-controlled items to Iran. Furthermore we asked Japan Customs to check all exports of industrial ovens to Iran.

When it comes to epoxy resins that you mentioned in your non-paper, it is neither practical nor appropriate to check all exports of epoxy resins to Iran since they are so widely and commonly used for variety of civil applications.

Useful as your information (is) on epoxy resins, it is so broad that we need more clarification. It would be truly appreciated if you could provide us further information as follows.

1) Concrete features or characteristics of epoxy resins which may be required to bind carbon fibers used in centrifuges.

2) Specific commercial names of epoxy resins, if any.

3) How does the Government of the United States control epoxy resins (shipped) to Iran?

END OF TEXT.
SCHIEFFER